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DO WE COMPARE SOCIETIES  
WHEN WE COMPARE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS? 
 
Christine Musselin 
Centre de Sociologie des Organisations - CNRS 
 
 
Exchanges have been very numerous and dense between the tenants of the 
societal analysis on the one hand, and the tenants of the sociology of 
organized action on the other, each of them developing their own positions, 
putting forward their arguments, but always with openness to others’ 
arguments, so that, from one text to another, a real dialog took place (cf. 
especially, Maurice et al. 1982; Maurice 1989; Friedberg 1993; Maurice 1994a 
and 1994b). In these writings, two themes are always coming back and force. 
The first one deals with the status of international comparison, to which M. 
Maurice and his colleagues attach a central place while E. Friedberg (1994: 
143) considers it only as a variant of the principe of systematic comparison 
which is the heart of the aproach he developed with M. Crozier: "Comparison 
does not need to be international. It is only late that the research lead by the 
Centre de sociologie des organisations included this dimension. But from the 
beginning on, they were comparative. From this point of view, international 
comparison makes no difference." The second theme deals with the question 
of generalization, a point which is constitutive of the societal analysis while 
local orders are the principal object of the sociology of organized action. 
 
These two themes are generally discussed out of any reference to their 
implications for the field work, especially when each of these schools is 
leading comparative studies on two or more countries. Thus, I would like to 
come back to these points and present the case of the France-Germany 
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comparison I have been leading (with Erhard Friedberg) on higher education 
for more than twelve years, and which has been prolonged with a Ph’D on the 
public university system of the State University of New York (Brisset-Sillion 
1994a, 1994b, 1996 and 1997). This will allow me to explain, more precisely 
than I ever did, how the comparative approach shaped our research program, 
then to discuss the effective contributions of international studies, and finally 
to explicit the level and degree of generalization we reached.  
 
What I would like to show is that both approaches can reach the 
reconstruction of national models and that comparative studies are especially 
good at this. But I will also plea that the kind of generalization aimed at by 
the sociology of organized action is not of the same type as the societal 
analysis’s one: for the former the links between micro and macro 
phenomenons and regulations remain loose and the national models are 
always in competition/interaction with (and not embedded in) local orders. 
 
Compare, analyse and then construct other objects to be 
compared 
 
Our research led us to describe different national models, the structure of 
which is revealed and understandable through the nature and the content of 
the interactions between: the state and especially the state agencies in charge 
of higher education (Friedberg and Musselin 1992 and 1993; Berrivin and 
Musselin 1996); disciplines1 engaged in the allocation of scientific reward and 
in the management of carriers (Friedberg and Musselin 1989b; Musselin 1996); 
and finally universities, understood as institutions within which more or less 
                                                 
1  With the term "disciplines" I will mean what is related to "disciplines’ specialities" as well 
as to structures involved in the defense of interests, in the management of carriers, in the 
attribution of scientific reward. 
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coherent forms of collective action emerge (Musselin 1987; Friedberg and 
Musselin 1989a; Musselin 1997b).  
 
Such interactions shape a general framework, which determines constraints as 
well as it generates resources, but that is no more than a framework: as a 
matter of facts it admits diversity from one university to another, from one 
discipline to another and from one state agency to another. Thus, we 
described national modes of regulation that never totally determine the 
behaviors of the actors within them but that are pregnant enough to exercise a 
certain influence beyond the differences among the disciplines and beyond 
the heterogeneity of the characteristics each institution owns. They are also 
stable enough, not to be automatically modified when persons, rules, status or 
policy orientations change. 
 
In other words, each national configuration can be understood and qualified 
through the specific combination that occurs between institutional logics (the 
universities’ ones), the academic logics (the disciplines’ ones) and the public 
logics (the state agencies’ ones). The articulation between these logics is 
proper to each studied system as the latter is the product of the 
interdependances that arise among these logics and that form what we called 
a "national university system". Through this notion, we have thus developed 
an approach that, on the one hand, does not allow to propose a universal 
model for higher education, but that, on the other hand, is convenient to point 
out divergences and convergences among different countries through the 
analysis of dimensions whose relevance has been experienced in the various 
empirical studies we led in France, Germany and the United States. Those 
dimensions have not been defined a priori, but emerged progressively and 
have been revealed out of the results of the first comparative work we led in 
France and in Germany. That is the reason why, I would like to come back to 
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the foundations of this international comparison, the questions it raised and 
the answers we tried to give. 
 
Comparing specific organizations 
 
Of course it is somewhat artificial to reconstruct the beginnings of a research 
strategy launched more than a decade ago. The principes and choices adopted 
at that time are certainly clearer and more evident to me now than when they 
have been settled, because it is also the practice that helps you discovering the 
benefits (and the dead ends) of the options you have defined or that you have 
been obliged to accept in order to start. 
 
In this first part I will describe how we developed our research on the basis of 
a first comparative work on France and Germany. This study aimed at 
studying universities as organizations, and thus reflected a certain disruption 
with the great majority of the previous comparative research on higher 
education that most of the time can be related to what M. Maurice (1989) 
called the functionalist perspective. As a matter of facts, universities and 
academic work have frequently been understood as universal categories 
whose common denominator was their "exceptionalim": they are presented as 
irreducible to any other forms of human activities or of organizations. Thus 
the academic is a pecular figure, whose specific character is first of all defined 
by his belonging to a discipline, by his relation to knowledge, by his mission 
in the society, etc. So, in many researches, the national, cultural or historical 
features are ignored or taken for insignificant, while, on the contrary, the 
social, cognitive, epistemological or normative traits that differenciate 
disciplines from one another are put forward, beyond the geographical or 
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institutional boundaries (see for instance: Kuhn 1962; Polanyi 1962 or Becher 
1989). 
 
The other way round, little attention is given to the institutions’ way of 
functioning whereas scientific (and pedagogical) work occurs within them. 
This reflects three different postures towards those institutions. Either 
universities are ignored in favour of the intangible concept of University. 
Either, they are taken for quasi transparent and thus for having no effects on 
behaviors (this position is very frequent among the sociology or the 
anthropology of science2). Either it is assumed that they just are the reflect of 
the activities and of the actors involved within them: then the point is to stress 
their "a-normal" character, to show their difference. In this case, the 
particularity of academic activities is a good reason to treat universities as 
singular organizations that develop (and ought to develop) specific relations 
with the political sphere as well as with economic one and the society as a 
whole. So, because to be an academic is not considered as an activity like the 
others, universities are all supposed to possess the same characteristics that 
distinguish them clearly from other organizations and other productive 
places. That is the reason why, in such a perspective, it is admitted that there 
exists more convergences between two universities in two different countries 
than between a university and a firm in the same country. The fact of 
describing them as "organized anarchies" (Cohen et al. 1972), "professionnal 
bureaucracies" (Mintzberg 1979) or "loosely coupled systems" (Weick 1976), 
belongs to the same process: it puts universities into categories to stress their 
similarities and to distinguish them from other organizations.  
 
                                                 
2  This seems to me particularly true in Latour et Callon’s works (See for instance, Latour 
and Woolgard 1979 and Callon 1989): the porte-parole in the socio-technical networks can 
translate and enroll as if they were free of any institutional contraint and weight.  
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The idea of a university "nature" that transcends cultures and societies seems 
all the more evident that their seems to exist some "institutional isomorphism 
through mimetic process" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) among universities 
from one country to another: discipline based units (departments) grouped 
into intermediary structures (the UFR —Unités de Formation and de Recherche— 
in France, the Fachbereiche in Germany, the colleges in the United States), a 
president and some vice-presidents, some administratif staff parallel to this 
professional structure, and some deliberative instances. This formal 
similarity, the increasing relationships among academics from different 
countries, plurinational research programs, are as many features to 
demonstrate the internationalization of scientific exchanges and the rising 
convergences among structures that produce and deliver knowledge (see for 
instance Rhoades 1990 or Crawford et al. 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, some research, most of them american, introduced a different 
perspective and contributed to the "desingularization" of universities as they 
tried to analyse them as they would have done for any other kind of 
organizations. So did P. Blau (1973) in a book, debatable in other respects, in 
which he described universities as bureaucracies; J. Baldridge (1971) took 
them as fieldstudies to develop his political model of decision-making; Pfeffer 
and Salancik (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974) found in 
universities an example for their resource-dependance theory. For these 
authors, the way of functionning to be found in universities can not be 
reduced to the ways by which they produce and transmit knowledge3. They 
show that it is pertinent as well to wonder how actors socialized in and by 
different disciplines, and poorly engaged in working together, will manage 
the minimum of cooperation imposed by their belonging to the same 
                                                 
3  Even if they also take into account such dimensions in their work, see for (Pfeffer and 
Moore 1980). 
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institution and make decision upon budget, seminars allocation, the building 
of new curricula, the management of space, the recruitment of new faculty 
members etc. 
 
It is with such a perspective that we started a first research project in 1984, 
seeking to compare how different institutions manage this minimum of 
cooperation. Let us be honnest: hazard and chance explained why we led this 
comparison in two different countries4. For the questionning we had at the 
time, the realization fieldwork in two countries was not a necessity. But for 
various reasons, the opportunity was given to us and, moreover it seemed 
relevant to take it. As a matter of fact French and German universities looked 
rather "similar", as, in both countries, higher education relies on convergent 
principes: it belongs to the public sector, faculty members are civil servants, 
the fees are very low, and every person who has the baccalauréat in France or 
the Abitur in Germany can enter the university. Moreover, the recent past of 
the universities in both countries also tended to make them closer: they 
overwent the same increase in students numbers in the sixties, the same 
student riots by the end of the sixties, some new framework laws (the loi 
d’orientation of 1968 in France and the Hochschulrahmengesetz of 1976 in 
Germany) that modified the universities’ status in order to set more 
democratic decision-making processes by introducing representants of non-
professoral staff (assistants, students, administrative staff...) in the 
deliberative instances. For that reason the formal structure as well as the 
missions of French and German universities looked very similar and 
comparable.  
 
                                                 
4  I could speak German and was interested in comparative work about these two countries, 
but the real oppportunity arrose during a conference on higher education, among 
academics who launched the idea of a research project on this subject.  
 8 
Thus, we adopted an approach that compared objects that, at first, were not 
too different, so that the possible divergences that we would notice would be 
all the more questionnable.  
 
Analysing divergences and similarities 
 
The comparison we led among the four monographs we wrote at that time5 
stressed on the one hand some clear convergences in both countries: 
functional interdependancy among faculty members is weak; this feature is 
reinforced and encouraged by the institutional environments (ministries, 
research funds, etc.) that directly allocate material and symbolic scientific 
reward; the administrative staff is not strong enough to promote collective 
action; the academic leaders do not act as managers but as representants (or 
primus inter pares). The other way round, French and German universities 
could be opposed on two other points: first on the behaviors and the discurse 
of professors towards their institution and their deliberative bodies; second, 
on the way the latters do function, that is their course of action and the type of 
decisions they make.  
 
Putting forward those divergences/convergences has been a first crucial step. 
Then started a second step that raised even more questions: the interpretation 
of these first results. As a matter of facts, the divergences’ analysis quickly 
appeared to be more difficult but also more learningfull than the 
convergences’ one. In fact, the latters are deeply related to the very nature of 
scientific and pedagogical activities for which strong cooperation and 
                                                 
5  These studies occured between February 1984 and June 1986. The main material consisted 
in semi-directive interviews from one and half to two hours. It has been completed by 
work on documents (reports on the universities, catalogs of courses, budgets, hearings of 
the deliberative bodies, etc.). 342 interviews have been led, 187 of them in Germany. 
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collaboration are not necessary among faculty members, even if nuances are 
to be observed that have more to do with the characteristics of each discipline 
than with national patterns. These convergences rely on the same strategies 
aiming at maintaining as much autonomy as possible. Thus, the weakness of 
the functional interdependance among faculty members is not only 
constitutive of this type of activity, it is also a social product: actors identify 
themselves with autonomy and adopt behaviors that seek to increase it as 
much as possible. So, the exceptionnalism of this kind of activities appears to 
be reinforced by the academics themselves!  
 
Nevertheless, because of these similarities, the observed differences became 
even more surprising: we could state a great convergence in the way 
academics manage their teaching duties, create new curricula, develop 
research activities etc., but, the other way round, we found they had different 
relations to the collectivity and to the institution as a whole, from one country 
to the other. Because the distinction line is national, it questioned the 
relevance of any endogeneized explanation of the observed divergences, that 
is to say an explanation that would seek interpretative elements in the local 
adjustements and in the local orders of each German university on the one 
hand and of each French university on the other. In other words, the 
divergences we met implied to redesign the boundaries of our research object: 
it was necessary to leave the university’s limit in order to explane the 
variations we observed in the relation to the collectivity between both 
countries.  
 
But, for methodological reasons, we decided that, at least to begin with , we 
would introduce either cultural explanations, nor historical interpretations 
(stressing for instance that German universities belong to a 150 year old 
tradition - the humboldtian one - whereas French universities got their 
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institutional autonomy only in 1968). On the contrary, we focused on 
mechanisms that are exogenious to the universities and that define a different 
context for action in both countries. 
 
That is the reason why we tackled the effects of the management of academics 
because it is very different from one country to another. In Germany, we 
observed two "curious6" characteristics: the recruitments of professors 
(especially for full professors) induce negociations on the resources he will get 
—Berufungsverhandlung— and the university is very active in this process; 
most of the assistants do not have the tenure and work on contracts that can 
be renewed only one time. These mechanims happened to become a central 
phenomenon to understand7 how German academics can, on the one hand, 
behave with great autonomy and try to limit interdependances among them 
and, can, on the other hand, be more committed and loyal to their institution 
(whereas they generally experiment more mobility than their French 
counterparts), and also be able to introduce decision-making process in the 
deliberative bodies that allow them to make collective choice, especially vis-à-
vis the ministry. For these reasons, we analyzed the Berufungsverhandlung not 
simply as personalized fundings dedicated to the improvement of some 
academics work conditions, but, more symbolicaly, as the product of 
compromises that are inherent to each recruitment situation and that combine 
the discipline based logic to the institution’s one: allocating resources to 
improve work conditions does not only mean that scientific reward is 
translated into material values ("a price"), but also induces that the 
                                                 
6  Curiosity for a French observer. For the Germans, these negociations are so "natural" that 
they never present it as a distinctive trait of their higher education system and that they 
generally forget to mention it or to analyze its specific effects on the budgets allocation 
(see for instance U. Schimank’s paper (1994) which is examplary of this !). This type of 
negociation for civil servants (Beamter auf dauer) seems very unusual to the French. 
7  For more details, see Musselin (1987) and Friedberg and Musselin (1989a and 1989b). 
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universities has to set and shows its priorities and to find supplementary 
resources8.  
 
Defining new comparisons to be led 
 
The influence of these recruitment and carrier mechanisms on the relation to 
the collectivity and on the behaviors in the deliberative bodies led us thus to 
depart ourselves from the micro-level (academics at work) as well as from the 
meso-level (university governments) and to pay more attention to the macro-
level of analysis (more precisely the national one), as academic carriers, in 
France and in Germany, do occure on a national marketplace9 which is 
organized by national rules and procedures (and even a national comittee in 
the case of France). 
 
A second element spoke also in favor of exogenious explanations: the state 
agency role. The relationships between the minister of Land and the German 
academics were more dense, developed and frequent than the relationships 
between the French academics and their parisian state agencies. Moreover, 
while the ministries of Land take part to the recruitment decisions10, the 
French national ministry does not intervene on this matter, whereas it is very 
active in the definition and modification of the rules and procedures that 
structure the carrier paths. For all these reasons, it seemed pertinent to pay 
                                                 
8  Either by internal redistribution or by argumenting for supplementary resources by the 
ministry. 
9  Thus, if the publication of vacant positions occurs through different means in France and 
in Germany, it nevertheless always concern the whole country. 
10  They take part in two ways. First, through the control of the process conformity, but it 
very rarely contradicts the university choice. This control deals with the respect of the 
procedures but also with the "normality" of the choice, a candidate with a weak dossier 
should not be prefered to candidates with great reputation. Second, the ministry can 
intervene and have a more active role, if the university asks him for supplementary 
resources in order to recruit a very interesting candidate.  
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more attention to the state agencies and to his influence on the university 
government, either.  
 
The research we then led was thus centered on the relationships between the 
ministry and the universities on the one hand, and between the ministry and 
the academics on the other. In other words, we wanted to understand how 
state agencies work and how they interact with the universities and with the 
academic profession. This led us to describe two different national models 
that can be opposed on these three dimensions (see Table 1)  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
So, the different types of articulations we found between the academic 
profession and the institutions had to be related to the different types of 
articulations (in nature and content) we observed between the ministry and 
the universities and between the ministry and the academic profession. These 
various mechanims exercise reinforcing effects on governance and on 
collective action in the universities of both countries. In France the dominance 
of discipline based logics of action11 weakens local university government 
and is in opposition to the emergence of institutional autonomy (Musselin 
1995). In Germany, on the contrary, beacause the university is recognized as a 
pertinent intermediary structure for negociation and steering, this institution 
beneficits from more leeway to exercise its autonomy12. 
 
                                                 
11   There are weaker since the beginning of the nineties especially since the State agencies 
sign four year contracts with each university (Frémont 1991; Berrivin and Musselin 1996 
and Musselin 1997b). 
12  Cécile Brisset-Sillion confirms the importance of these relationshipes in her study on an 
american public system of higher education (called the State University of New York). 
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From comparison to generalization 
 
While reconstructing the research works we led on French and German 
higher education systems, I tried to describe the way we have been using 
international comparison and to show that it has been a process of results’ 
production, formulation of questions and definition of new fieldworks. 
Relying on this particular example, I would like to show that different levels 
of comparison were central in the generalization process we engaged. Then I 
would also like to precise the status we attached to comparison and to the 
effects an international perspective induces. 
 
Going from specificity to generalization through a comparative process 
 
The research project I described above in fact did not involve only 
international comparison but different types of comparative processes to 
progressively go from singularity to general, from individual data to more 
global modes of regulation.  
 
One reason for this is that the data collected during the fieldwork were of 
different kinds: in our case, we principally worked with interviews describing 
activities and interactions and including advices, opinions, explanations, little 
stories etc., but also documents and sometimes even observations. All those 
data are never completely comparable one with another. It means that we had 
to sery out the multiplicy and the diversity of facts and elements. In this 
purpose, we first confronted data about the actors by qualifying their 
relationships (nature, content, intensity). It was then possible to compare 
these relationships and to analyze the divergences and convergences that 
were to be seen. A third level of comparison dealt with the logics of action 
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that structure these relationships and with the coherence among these logics, 
in order to discover the more general modes of regulation which structure the 
relationships within the university. Confrontating the results of each 
monograph represented a fourth level of comparison. Thus, it was only at this 
moment that the comparison between France and Germany occured and, as a 
consequence, on already rather agregated data, for the actors concerned as 
well as for the compared phenomenons (deliberative bodies, decision-making 
process...). 
 
Finally, our interest for the universities/state/academic profession 
relationships leads us a step forward towards generalization, as we tried to 
compare and understand modes of regulations and logics of action among 
these corporate actors.  
 
Comparison as an heuristic tool 
 
As pointed above, hazard confronted me to international comparison and my 
problematic at the beginning has not been defined13 in terms specific to 
international work. My point was not to compare France and Germany in 
order to discover differences (or convergences) between each countries 
through their higher education systems, but, more "simply" to compare 
organizations that have the same vocation, and that happen to be located in 
two different countries. What may be regarded as "methodological 
inconsciensnous" by specialists of international comparison, was (and still is 
from my point of view) legitimated by the place accorded to the comparative 
approach in our research —would it be led or not on different countries— 
                                                 
13  All the more as it was one of the first study led in different countries at the Centre de 
Sociologie des Organisations. 
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and by our way of using comparison, that is as a tool for discovery serving an 
inductive research strategy. As a matter of fact, comparison has a double aim 
in the studies we led: pointing out convergences and divergences, but also 
finding the explanatory system that will give sense to the latters. In other 
words, comparison is settled in an inductive approach and in an heuristic 
process that do not forecast the convergence/divergence elements to be 
found, nor than they set a priori the kind of explanation systems (for instance 
universal hypothesis, culturel specificity, societal effects...) that would have to 
be mobilized to interprete the results obtained.  
 
Thus, in a first step, we just try to discover differences or convergences we 
did not know before and, through this process, to deconstruct and reconstruct 
"natural" categories, notions, object, collective actors. The fact that comparison 
may be international has no impact on this step. In the same country, 
categories or object that seem identical may hide very different practices, 
representations, etc. On the contrary, an international comparison may not 
lead to the observation of divergences (Neuville 1996) and then the question 
to be raised is why the national context does not make any difference. 
 
After the description of convergences or divergences, it is then time for 
interpretation. The latter has to be coherent with the obtained results and can 
not pre-exist to the study. In the fieldwork we led on French and German 
universities, we did not make hypothesis about the dividing lines we will 
find, nor about the explanatory models we would use, as they depend of the 
type of convergences/divergences we would meet: would each monograph 
be a particular case that can not be reduce to the three others (which would 
have favoured endogenious explanation)? Or, on the contrary, would we find 
so strong convergences that we would be able to propose a single university 
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model (universalist model of explanation)? Or would we have to distinguish 
France and Germany (national model or societal effect)?, etc.  
 
One of the difficulty inherent to this approach is that, will it be international 
or not, comparison can be a heuristic tool only if it deals with a priori 
comparable objects. Because it should go over the appearant similarities, the 
latters have to be the starting point of the comparison, in order to be put into 
question afterwards. The way we used comparison thus admits contrasts (a 
new university and an old one, for instance) but does not allow much 
heterogeneity (for instance, comparing a university to a firm or even to a 
French Grande Ecole seems to me weakly pertinent), because differences as 
well as convergences then loose their signification and their explanatory 
strenght: it is then much more difficult to distinguish what can be understood 
thanks to statutory or to structural differences and what is a matter of the 
games in which actors are engaged and that they contribute to produce and to 
maintain. 
 
International comparison makes difference 
 
Shall we nevertheless come to the conclusion that international comparison 
does not make any difference and that it is indifferent to stay at the infra-
national level or to led an international study? I do not think so. From my 
point of view, the comparison between France and Germany had at least three 
effects: a lightening one, a validating one and an crushing one. 
 
Of course, it is not possible to know what I will have found, would the study 
be led only on French universities. Nevertheless, it seems obvious to me that 
international comparison modifies the glance at the French results. For 
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instance, the impact of the disciplines experts on the French central 
administration would have anyway been an important point in the study of 
the French state agencies, but I would have found it rather trivial. On the 
contrary, it becomes "extraordinary14" in respect with the absence of such 
experts in German ministries. Thus, international comparison offers a 
different light and obliges us to reconsider what seems too quickly "natural", 
shakes evidences and reveals our ordinary knowledge. 
 
International comparison also has a lightening effect because it allows a better 
identification of what is specific to the studied object and what is related to its 
integration in a larger frame. Thus, having comparative elements that are 
exterior to France and that point out differences between the two countries, 
helps us in distinguishing what refers to national variables and what does not 
(for instance the weak functional interdependancy among academics). For 
that reason international comparison possesses a validating effect, as the 
general explanations found for one country can be validated (or not) for 
another country. 
 
But international comparison also introduces bias, because it contrains to 
hierarchize differences and convergences. Let me take an example. In 
Germany, higher education is in charge of the Länder, and we compared the 
functions and the styles of intervention of three ministries of Land. For each of 
them, we were able to identify a specific higher education policy and a 
specific way of functionning15. Would our work be limited to Germany, we 
certainly have stressed these differences. But, compared to the French state 
                                                 
14  Whereas it is a part of the ordinary knowledge of each French academics who are used to 
submit research or pedagogical projects to their peers and never to the administrative 
staff. 
15  We distinguished three models: a bureaucratic one, an hierarchical one and a political one 
(Friedberg and Musselin 1993). 
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agencies, there was then no ambiguity about the conclusion to raise: the 
French ministry is very different from the German ones and this distance 
became the principal fact. But of course, it obliged to crush the infra-national 
differences and to treat them as nuances in a more general pattern: it 
minimized infra-national differences and tends to neglect the impact of 
mechanisms that are either national nor societal. The positive aspect of this, is 
that it helps generalization. But what kind of a generalization? That will be 
my last point now. 
 
Systemic coherences or societal effects? 
 
How far can we generalize what we learn from our France/Germany 
comparison? I see two possible ways. 
 
First, this research proposes an analytic framework that can be, transfered in 
other countries than France and Germany as it suggests that that the degree of 
autonomy universities should always be understood in interactions with the 
academic profession and the state agencies. The research led by Cécile Brisset-
Sillion on the State University of New York (SUNY) gives an example of such 
a transfer.  
 
Second, our work offers a possibility for generalization because, studying the 
modes of regulation and the logics of action among the universities, the state 
and the academic profession, we also tried to understand how the three of 
them are articulated, constructed and institutionalized. From this point of 
view, and using the vocabulary of the societal analysis, our work states 
consistencies between the discipline based intercourse, the public (or political) 
one and the organizational one. It also allows the reconstruction of collective 
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actors who have different identities in both countries: as a matter of fact the 
figure of the German professors does not bear the same representations, the 
same leeway for action, the same relation to the university collectivity and to 
the society, as the French one; the German university either does not have the 
same place, the same functions, etc. Thanks to a more longitudinal approach, 
we could show how those identities have been structured in relation to the 
process of institutionalization that the relationships between the universities, 
the state and the academic profession knew in each country (Musselin 1995).  
 
As a matter of fact, and beyond the divergences I pointed out in this text, the 
sociology of organized action, applied to international comparative work, 
find many resonances with the societal analysis. Nevertheless, it remains a 
crucial difference that is related to the explanatory scope attributed to such 
national models.  
 
In the sociology of organized action, as I practiced it, I went from specificity to 
generalization but it does not mean that the micro level is closely related to 
the macro one. Through the comparative process I described above, we 
progressively went from one level to another, from the interpersonal 
relationships, to more global and more generic modes of regulation. This led 
us to the identification of national models that describe (make visible and 
resume in a certain way) the frames that structure the collective action. These 
frames limit the actors’ behaviors in orienting the allocation of resources and 
constraints. They are in the same time constructed through the interactions 
among the actors and are the product of the exchanges, adjustments, 
arrangements that have developed and have been institutionnalized, but that 
can be renegociated and modified. But, these general modes of regulation are 
not inscribed in the actors. They are just one of the elements of the actors’ 
social construct. We have been able to qualify in a generic manner the content 
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and the nature of the relationships that arise between the ministry and the 
universities, the ministry and the academic profession, and between the 
universities and the academic profession. We have been able to explicite the 
stakes behind those relationships and thus to identify the modes of regulation 
that structure them. We have been able to show that these modes of 
regulation are not independant from one another. Nevertheless this tells us 
nothing about the each time different and original way by which, each 
individual actor (in our case an academic) will articulate his belonging to a 
discipline, his belonging to a single institution, and his belonging to a national 
system. So it tells nothing about the way he will construct his own identity. 
The more we generalize, the looser the links between general regulations and 
local interaction.  
 
For these reasons, the explanatory scope of the national systems we described 
in France and in Germany has to be relativised. I show in the first part of this 
text the limits of the research on universities and disciplines that do not pay 
attention to the national variables. Conversely, it would be as excessive to say 
that national models can either account for, nor give sense to all that happens 
in universities and disciplines. As a consequence, the notion of societal effect 
seems to global to me. Societal analysts recognize that societal effects do not 
determine the actors but they nevertheless add that the latter are "caught and 
conceived through the social intercourses (educative, productive, 
organizational, of cooperation or negociation) that contribute to produce them 
(Maurice 1994 a: 654)."  
 
Within such a perspective, and in the specific case of higher education, this 
would mean that the discipline-effect and the university-effect are 
subordinated to the national modes of regulation. But it is not so: these 
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different effects are in interdependance and in competition one with another, 
at the local level.  
 
That is why the identification of national models should not be assimilated to 
the reconstruction of a societal order or the entfolding of a meta-structure, 
and why we only partially compare societies when we compare national 
university systems. This is precisely on this point that I see most of the 
divergences between me and the societal analysts who, it seems to me, use 
societal effects as if they were meta-structures. From this point of view, and 
even if such a statement would need longer explanations, they are very close 
to other streams with which they had less exchanges than with the sociology 
of organized action. For instance: the american neo-institutionalist 
sociologists16 for which actors share beliefs, norms, values or common 
representations that constitute what they call "institutions" or "institutional 
environments. These latters construct their cognitive perception of the 
situation in which they are engaged, and "determine" or, ad minima, 
circonscribe their actions (cf. for instance Berger and Luckman 1966; Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1985). I also refere to some works in 
political science this time, and more precisely to B. Jobert and P. Muller 
(Jobert and Muller 1987; Faure et al. 1997) who use the notion of global 
referential to integrate all the different systems of action in a common 
representation of the world which is embedded in the individual/society 
relationship.  
 
Societal analysts, neo-institutionnalists and tenants of the referential analysis 
all propose a well-ordered conception of the social world that hangs over and 
                                                 
16  Sociologists, political scientists ans economists use the notion of "neo-institutionalism" but 
in relative different ways. For a synthetic but rich presentations of each of these theses and 
for a confrontation on their different contributions, see Hall and Taylor (1996). 
 22 
embodies the individual actor, even if these three streams admits that in 
return this macro-structure is (at least partially) constructed by the actors. But, 
this subordination of the local orders to a more global one is debatable for me. 
Saying that, I do not mean that there exist no macro-mechanisms, no national 
model, no societal effects. I just state that they do not take the leas of the 
others. They are just one of the "frames" that circonscribe individual actions, 
one of the "institutions" that participate to the cognitif perception of 
situations, one of the effects that structure the actors’ identity, one of the 
referential individuals can act and think their relation to the world. For that 
reason local orders can simultaneously be very different on one territory (or 
within a society): they always account for the contingent articulation the 
actors produced at the local level among various "frames of action". Of course, 
it may happen situations in which individual behaviors are strongly 
connected to some societal effects, to an institutional environment or to a 
specific referential17. But, such closure are not the rule: they are the exception. 
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